Showing posts with label Nigeria. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nigeria. Show all posts

Sunday, August 22, 2010

The war of ideas

‘The propagandist writes solely with the intention of appealing to his readers’ interest. He aims to hit, because he cannot afford to miss.
Accordingly his work is based on the formulae of modern advertising, to whose task his own runs broadly parallel.

It differs only in that the propagandist is at greater pains than the copywriter to disguise his medium. The reader of an advertisement should never be provoked into feeling: “This is only an advertisement.” The reader of propaganda should, if possible, never be allowed even to suspect that he is reading propaganda.’
These words, written in April 1943, are contained in the syllabus used by the Special Training Schools of the Special Operations Executive. Variations of this syllabus were used in different training schools, but this passage comes from the one used by STS 103 in Canada, also known as Camp X, where members of SOE and OSS trained together.

As this document was used to train secret agents, its authors’ names do not appear anywhere in it, but we now know that it was written by two SOE instructors: Paul Dehn (left) and Kim Philby (right). Dehn, a poet and novelist, became a well-known scriptwriter after the war, working on the screenplays of both The Spy Who Came In From The Cold and Goldfinger. Philby went on to rise through the ranks of MI6 and was tipped by many to head it, but was eventually exposed as a double agent working for the Soviets, having been recruited while a student at Cambridge University in the 1930s.

There is a chilling irony in the fact that Kim Philby was one of the writers of the syllabus used to train British secret agents during the Second World War – and one has to wonder as a result how much of it might be propaganda. This is what James Jesus Angleton famously referred to as the ‘wilderness of mirrors’ that populates the world of espionage. Even when being taught about propaganda, you might be subject to it.

In October 1953, a new monthly magazine was launched in Britain: Encounter. An Anglo-American publication, it was a literary magazine that also discussed politics: it was liberal but anti-Communist. Its first editors were Irving Kristol and the poet Stephen Spender, and it was funded by the Paris-based Congress for Cultural Freedom. It became very influential, publishing the work of many of the most famous writers and thinkers of the day, including WH Auden, Vladimir Nabokov, Iris Murdoch and Bertrand Russell. But in 1967, it was revealed that the Congress for Cultural Freedom was a CIA front, and that most of the finance for the magazine had come straight from the CIA’s coffers, with the remainder being provided by the British Foreign Office’s innocuously named Information Research Department – in fact, a secret group dedicated to spreading anti-Communist propaganda. This isn’t a conspiracy theory but widely-documented fact, which the CIA itself acknowledges. Stephen Dorril discusses it at length in his book, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service.

The idea for the magazine grew from meetings between MI6 and the CIA, who were looking for a way to influence the thinking of Britain’s liberal and left-wing intelligentsia. Steering the Congress for Cultural Freedom was CIA officer Michael Josselson, a former member of the Psychological Warfare Division. On the British side, the two leaders of the project were initially Tosco Fyvel, a member of the IRD who had been a close friend of George Orwell, and Malcolm Muggeridge, a senior journalist at The Daily Telegraph who also worked for MI6 ‘part time’. Muggeridge eventually grew disillusioned with the behind-the-scenes machinations and withdrew from the project. He was replaced by Goronwy Rees, another MI6 agent. But, to make matters a little trickier, we now know that before the war Rees had passed information to the Soviets, who had given him the codenames FLEET and GROSS.

Encounter’s readers could not, of course, be allowed to suspect that anything they read in the magazine might be propaganda. The merest hint of such a thought would mean the propaganda was ineffective. As a result, the CIA and MI6 left the majority of the magazine’s content alone. That way, it established itself and was soon taken by the intelligentsia in Britain as a genuine and unadulterated liberal voice. Articles that criticized censorship of the arts and other forms of repression behind the Iron Curtain were quietly encouraged, and articles that criticized American foreign or domestic policy were quietly discouraged. Stephen Dorril also reveals in his book the practice of MI6 agents writing articles in the press under pseudonyms, and discusses several such articles published by The Spectator in 1994.

As a result of this hornet's nest, figuring out today which of Encounter’s articles were written with no agenda and which were placed to plant ideas in readers’ minds is a difficult task. Similarly, some articles might have been written by authors who had no idea of the magazine’s real backers, but were published either because they coincidentally transmitted a desirable message, or because they served as good cover for other propaganda to be slipped between.

A good example of this can be found in the issue of May 1966, which I mentioned in my last blog post. The issue contains articles by, among others, Anthony Burgess, Eugène Ionesco, Robert Graves, Frank Kermode (by then an editor of the magazine), Tom Driberg, Malcolm Muggeridge and John le Carré. An extremely impressive line-up of contributors. Any of these articles might have been used by the CIA and MI6 for their own purposes, with the authors’ knowledge. Any may have been used by the CIA and MI6 without the authors’ knowledge. And any may have been used against the CIA and MI6, without their knowledge.

An example of the latter could be Tom Driberg’s article. Driberg was a prominent journalist, Labour MP and, later, Baron Bradwell. He was also gay, and on visiting Moscow in 1956 to interview the British double agent Guy Burgess, he regularly frequented a lavatory behind the Metropole Hotel to pick up men. The KGB showed him ‘compromising material’ of his visits there, and he was recruited as an agent as a result, and given the codename LEPAGE. One of his first acts was the publication of a book claiming that Burgess had never spied for the Soviet Union.

But Driberg broke off contact with the KGB in 1968, and his very dull 1966 article about Edith Sitwell is not a piece of propaganda for either side in the Cold War. Still, it is intriguing that a Soviet agent was writing articles in an MI6/CIA-fronted magazine. Especially considering Rees' involvement – one has to wonder whether the KGB tried to insert its own propaganda into the enemy's propaganda machine.

The article by John le Carré is also worth a closer look, but for very different reasons. Le Carré had worked for both MI5 and MI6, and knew Muggeridge, who had interviewed him just three months earlier for the BBC, as discussed in my last post. But in 1966 le Carré was firmly against American foreign policy, and it is hard to imagine a writer less likely to choose to work for the CIA. Even unknowingly, his article goes against what both MI6 and the CIA would have liked the magazine’s readers to think, because although he attacks many of the problems in the Soviet Union, he concludes that ‘there is no victory and no virtue in the Cold War, only a condition of human illness and a political misery’.

But I think John le Carré was unknowingly used in a different way: his article was one of the many hundreds of genuine ones published in Encounter that provided a suitable context in which MI6 and the CIA could insert a few articles that would make the points they wanted to make, and be taken seriously as a result of the background provided by others. I think one of these articles appears in this issue.

Titled ‘Africa Without Tears’, it was written by Rita Hinden, a socialist South African academic at the University of London, in reaction to news of a series of political murders that had taken place in Nigeria – murders that turned out to be the firing shots in what would become a lengthy civil war. I don’t know whether Hinden wrote the article on the behest of the CIA or MI6, but I think it may have suited their aims, as in it she essentially argued why everyone should turn a blind eye to the worsening political situation in Nigeria and, in effect, let the Africans get on with killing each other.

Hinden made this argument in a way that appears extremely heartless with the knowledge of the deaths that resulted in the civil war, but even without hindsight it is an example of the sort of bizarre double-think some intellectuals engaged in at the time. She develops her thesis over several thousand words, but I think a sense of what she was doing can be seen in the callousness of the title, and in the article’s final paragraph:
‘As long as we continue to regard Africans as a “special case” to be courted, flattered, excused, expected-greater-things-from, grieved-over, explained-away, we will still not have recognized that they have, once and for all, severed the navel cord which used to bind us. And Africans will continue to regard us with the irritation – merging eventually into pity – which marks the attitude of grown-up children to their anxious, ridiculous parents.’
I have read this article many times, because my first novel was set in the Nigerian civil war. The article shocks me every time I read it. As well as being a contributor to Encounter, Hinden was the editor of a magazine called Socialist Commentary, which reflected the views of the pro-American right-wing of the Labour party at the time, and was also involved in the Fabian Society’s journal, Venture, which was funded by the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Michael Josselson described her as a ‘good friend of ours’ and said that the CIA relied heavily on her advice for their African operations.

This article of hers may not have been CIA propaganda, but it was nevertheless CIA-funded, and I think it was propaganda. Its aim was to plant the idea that post-colonial guilt is the real crime for which the article’s readers should feel guilty. It constitutes a ‘guilt complex’, and that ‘emotionalism’ is preventing people from seeing Africa in its proper perspective. Hinden suggested that anyone who felt that Britain had a responsibility to its former colonies was being condescending toward Africans – perhaps even racist. But her claim to respecting Africans was insincere, simply a pretence that offered readers a convenient excuse for ignoring a growing crisis in a country that, in 1966, had been independent just six years, following 160 years of British rule. It’s not callous to be indifferent to the situation in Nigeria, she argued: it’s treating them as the adults they want to be. The article plants some very unpleasant ideas, which were doubtless digested and repeated in conversations across England in various forms in May 1966 and after.

The British government did become involved in the war in Nigeria, but mainly as a supplier of arms to the side they thought had the greater chance of winning and continuing to supply them with oil. Many people in Britain didn’t feel the way Rita Hinden did, and were deeply shocked and moved by the events that took place in Nigeria and Biafra, and many did something about it. Many in Nigeria and Biafra were irritated by Western involvement, but many others were not, as their lives were saved by organizations such as the International Red Cross, Caritas and others.

In his BBC interview with John le Carré, Malcolm Muggeridge revealed with a mischievous glint in his eye that he had once been involved in intelligence. In fact, he still was. John le Carré didn’t reveal that he had also been an intelligence operative, and he did not know that he was about to be used by MI6 in a very elaborate propaganda operation. The part he played in the operation was a very small one: an article about James Bond, which expanded on some of the thoughts he had already expressed in his interview with Muggeridge. The article acted as a lure: it was featured on the cover of the magazine, and le Carré’s name would have attracted readers. But it also acted as cover, because readers of his article may also have read Rita Hinden’s, and been influenced by it. In his article, le Carré wrote of his own novel, The Spy Who Came In From The Cold:
‘I tried to touch new ground when I discussed the phenomenon of committed men who are committed to nothing but one another and the dreams they collectively evoke. At heart, I said, professional combatants of the Cold War have no ideological involvement. Half the time they are fighting the enemy, a good deal of the time they are fighting rival departments. The source of their energy lies not in the war of ideas but in their own desolate mentalities; they are the tragic ghosts, the unfallen dead of the last war.’
There were, doubtless, many professional combatants during the Cold War who acted in just this way. But the irony is that, unknown to John le Carré, his own words were being used by men who did have an ideological involvement, and who were channeling their energies into the war of ideas.

Tuesday, May 4, 2010

Dark matter

My debut novel, Free Agent, was released in paperback in the UK by Simon & Schuster on April 29. You can buy it at all the usual places – please do! The novel is set in 1969, and follows British agent Paul Dark as he tries to discover the truth about his past and avoid being killed in the process. It is mainly set in England and Nigeria. I'll post in more detail about my research for it at a later date, but for now here's a visual hodge-podge of some of the books, magazines, pamphlets and images that I found useful when writing the novel. As usual, click on the images to enlarge them.



Tuesday, April 20, 2010

The real dogs of war

             
Dozens of books and films have told the stories of mercenaries in Africa. Jeremy Duns looks at the reality behind the myths

On November 30 1968, Paris Match published a story titled 'Biafra: Final Mission'. Dramatic black-and-white photos by Gilles Caron showed a group of Nigerian soldiers carrying a large white man across a river. The man, who had been shot in the stomach and heart, was Marc Goossens, a Belgian mercenary. When the soldiers reached the other side of the river, Goossens' fellow mercenaries searched his pockets and found his last pay-check – 4,000 US dollars – and a photograph of his girlfriend back in Ostend.

Goossens was one of several Belgian mercenaries in Africa in the 1960s. As a colonial power and home to one of the world's most prestrigious arms manufacturers, Fabrique National, Belgium was a natural recruiting ground for mercenary operations – some say it still is. In 2005, Mark Thatcher, son of the former British prime minister, pleaded guilty to breaking anti-mercenary laws in Equatorial Guinea, following accusations that he had financed a coup attempt in the oil-rich West African state. Newspapers focused on Thatcher and other high-profile British establishment figures alleged to have been involved, and on the background of the mercenaries' leader, Simon Mann (below), an Old Etonian and former member of Britain's special forces.

Few reports mentioned that the coup attempt had been a shambolic affair: the 'mercs' had flown into Harare in a plane that still carried the markings of the American Air National Guard, and had compounded the error by travelling with their weapons. Within minutes of landing, Mann and his associates were arrested by Zimbabwe's security forces. Many of the plotters were imprisoned.

The exploits of 'soldiers of fortune' have been told in countless books and films, but rarely do the accounts linger on the manacled, humiliated mercenary rotting in a jail cell, or the half-naked corpse being dragged through the bush.

Many of the myths of the modern mercenary started in the Congo. In the days after its independence from Belgium in June 30, 1960, the country rapidly spiralled out of control. Following a mutiny in the army, the local leader of the province of Katanga, Moise Tshombe, declared independence from the rest of the country. In February 1961, the country's first democratically elected prime minister, Patrice Lumumba (below), was assassinated with the complicity of the American and Belgian governments.

In 1964, Tshombe became prime minister, only to be deposed by General Joseph Mobutu the next year. Friends of Tshombe planned a second secession of Katanga, and on July 5, 1967, a 36-year-old Belgian plantation owner-turned-mercenary, Jean 'Black Jack' Schramme, who had been involved in the first secession, took 11 white mercenaries and around 100 Katangans to Stanleyville, where they fired on a Congolese army camp, killing troops and their families.

The Congolese army retaliated by killing 30 Katangan mercenaries (who had not been involved), after which Schramme's private army, nicknamed the Leopard Battalion, grew to around 1,000, 160 of which were foreign fighters. The Congolose army was around 30,000 strong. After weeks of fighting, the Leopard Battalion retreated to Bukavu, a coastal resort that had once been favoured by the Belgian colonisers.

Schramme set up a headquarters in the city's Royal Residence Hotel and issued an ultimatum to Mobutu in Kinshasa, giving him 10 days to negotiate peace. His terms included a return to democratic rule in the country and to appoint Tshombe – who was imprisoned in Algeria on treason charges – to his cabinet.

Mobutu refused, saying he would never negotiate with assassins (an ironic charge, considering that he is likely to have smoothed the way for the Americans and Belgians to assassinate Lumumba). Schramme warned that he might attack Kinshasa. 'We have shown that the Congolese National Army is incapable of defeating us.'

Schramme's men held Bukavu for seven weeks, after which Mobutu sent in paratroopers, followed by 15,000 regular troops. Frenchman Bob Denard had his own brigade of mercenaries – the infamous 'Affreux' – in Angola and tried to cut across to help Schramme, but was driven back by air strikes. On October 29, the Congolese army moved into Bukavu; a week later, the surviving members of Schramme's 'white giants' fled over the border to Rwanda.

While Schramme and his men were taking on the Congolese army, mercenaries were also flying into Nigeria. In May, the eastern region of the country had formed a breakaway state called Biafra. In the ensuing civil war, both sides recruited foreign mercenaries. There were about a dozen on the Biafran side, including Frenchman Denard, Briton 'Mad Mike' Hoare, 'Taffy' Williams, a South African of Welsh origin, and a German, Rolf Steiner. The Nigerians had Egyptian pilots loaned to them by the Russians, and John Peters, a Brit who had also been in the Congo.

It was an unusual situation: groups of mercenaries hadn't fought on opposite sides since the Carlist wars in Spain in the 19th century. The fear of killing old friends sometimes led to stalemates, and some commentators feel that the use of mercenaries helped prolong the civil war: more decisive action from them might have meant an end to their monthly salaries (transferred into Swiss bank accounts).

From 1968, Steiner, a former member of the Hitler Youth who had fought in Indo-China and Algeria, led the Biafrans' 4th Commando Brigade, which adopted a skull and crossbones insignia. The brigade was 3,000-strong at one point, and 'Big Marc' Goossens was one of around a dozen mercenaries serving in it. He had never planned to go to Biafra, but after a row with his girlfriend had left Belgium on an impulse.

In September '68, the 4th Commando mercenaries went on strike over outstanding salaries; according to the memoirs of Major-General Alexander Madiebo, who was commander of the Biafran Army, the transfer of fresh funds was negotiated by Steiner's interpreter at the time, former BBC and Reuters journalist Frederick Forsyth. Two months later, in an assault on Onitsha, Goossens met his end. 'One good thing about this war is that we're fighting the English on the other side!' he was reported to have said just hours before his death, seemingly forgetting that several Brits were also on his 'side'.

'Black Jack' Schramme never reappeared after the Congo, although rumours about him continued to be spread through books and films: one was that he fled to South America. Forsyth (pictured right), wrote a non-fiction work about the Nigerian civil war, The Biafra Story, before turning his hand to fiction. In 1978, after the worldwide success of his thriller The Day Of The Jackal, an article in The Sunday Times claimed that in 1973 Forsyth had helped fund an attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea by mercenaries who had previously worked in Biafra.

Forsyth denied the allegation, but he had already written The Dogs of War, which featured fictionalised versions of Steiner and the other mercenaries he had met in Biafra attempting to take over a mineral-rich West African country; Goossens was the inspiration for the character 'Tiny' Marc Vlaminck. Forsyth had written and researched much of the novel in Equatorial Guinea, and in 2006 he admitted that he had played a small part in the aborted coup attempt, posing as a South African arms-dealer to attend a meeting of gun-runners in Germany – his cover was apprarently blown when one of the arms dealers saw his photograph in the window of a Hamburg bookshop promoting the German edition of The Day of The Jackal.

No books or films will be made about Marc Goossens – all that remains of 'Big Marc' from Ostend are a few photos in an old issue of Paris Match.


A version of this article was first publised in The Bulletin magazine in February 2005.